Mostrando postagens com marcador Economia. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Economia. Mostrar todas as postagens

segunda-feira, 23 de abril de 2018

Board Games - Jogos de mesa

1. Star Wars Destiny

Um jogo que desperta a capacidade analítica e raciocínio lógico. Star Wars Destiny não exige dos jogadores um conhecimento profundo da saga, mas para avançar no game é importante ter algum conhecimento sobre a saga de Vader e Skywalker. O game pode ajudar o gestor na tomada de decisão rápida, pois aguça a elaboração de estratégias em tempo real à medida que as jogadas acontecem.

2. Blood Rage

Não é só a beleza do tabuleiro de Blood Rage que encanta. Esse game exige controle e estratégia do jogador não só para combater os líderes Vikings inimigos na alocação de soldados e recursos. É um jogo excelente para estimular o gestor a pensar sobre como utilizar as ferramentas disponíveis com eficiência, e identificar se os seus funcionários estão nas áreas corretas e cumprindo funções que deveriam. Muitas vezes um colaborador pode ter uma formação acadêmica em uma determinada área, mas ter aptidão para outra função. Esse game pode ajudar o gestor justamente nessa percepção.

3.Captain Sonar

Esse board game além de ser um dos mais lúdicos traz um dos itens mais importante para o sucesso de um negócio: O trabalho em equipe! Ambientado em uma batalha fictícia entre dois submarinos, o Capitão com auxílio do primeiro imediato e outros membros da equipe não conseguem obter êxito se não dividir as responsabilidades das ações no jogo. Ideal para jogar com os colaboradores e despertar esse espírito de união e sinergia para as atividades do dia a dia.

4. Onitama

Aparentemente simples mas extremamente complexo e estratégico, Onitama coloca os jogadores no papel de monges movendo seus iniciados em um tabuleiro, tentando garantir uma posição de vantagem sobre seu adversário. Exige análise preditiva e muita lógica. O jogo pode ser bom tanto para os gestores quanto colaboradores, pois evidencia a importância da tomada de decisões rápidas e racionais, além de despertar consciência de risco.

5. Coup

O último card game e não menos importante que os demais é rápido e que exige capacidade de leitura de sinais de seus oponentes para identificar se os mesmos estão falando a verdade ou não sobre seus personagens. Estimula a dinâmica de grupo, pois só pode ser jogado de três a dez participantes. Ideal para chamar grupo de funcionários de diferentes áreas para identificar habilidades.

terça-feira, 16 de maio de 2017

Rotas Estratégicas Setoriais

O projeto Rotas Estratégicas Setoriais tem o objetivo de construir coletivamente, com especialistas da academia, setor produtivo e governo, caminhos possíveis de desenvolvimento para os segmentos e áreas estratégicos, com a identificação de entraves existentes, ações resolutivas estratégicas e tecnologias-chaves para a competitividade do setor, ilustrados em roadmaps.
Os 17 setores e áreas priorizados como Setores Estratégicos para o Ceará foram organizados em 13 Rotas Estratégicas:
  • Água - Painel realizado
  • Biotecnologia - Painel realizado
  • Construção e Minerais Não Metálicos - Painel realizado
  • Economia Criativa e Turismo - Painel realizado
  • Economia do Mar - Painel realizado
  • Energia - Painel realizado e publicação entregue
  • Industria Agroalimentar - Painel realizado
  • Logística - Painel realizado e publicação entregue
  • Meio Ambiente - Painel realizado
  • Eletrometalmecânico - Painel realizado e publicação entregue
  • Produtos de Consumo: Couro & Calçados; Confecções; Madeira & Móveis  - Painel realizado
  • Saúde - Painel realizado
  • Tecnologia da Informação & Comunicação - TIC - Painel realizado

quinta-feira, 20 de novembro de 2014

Economia - Comentários Melhores livros 2014 segundo Strategy+Business

Thomas Piketty, translated by Arthur Goldhammer
Capital in the 21st Century
(Belknap Press, 2014)
Timothy F. Geithner
Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises
(Crown, 2014)

The politics, economics, and rhetoric of inequality have been inescapable over the past year. Not since the Gilded Age have we had such vigorous debates over the concentration of wealth and the gap between the rich and the poor. And not just in the United States. In China, where new fortunes are minted daily; in Europe, where social nets are fraying amid economic crises; and in India, where a gleaming technology industry coexists with Dickensian poverty, income inequality is a prominent and often divisive debate.
Among the dozens of books on economics that have crossed my desk in recent months, three in particular have helped illuminate the nature and impact—and resilience—of inequality in our world. One, far and away the best and most important book on economics of the year, is an academic tome on the progression, regression, and rebirth of inequality in Western Europe and the United States. One is a journalistic narrative that takes us deep into modern China, where rampant growth is simultaneously lifting millions from poverty and spawning unprecedented inequality. And one is a memoir of the feverish crisis years in the United States’ financial system, which inadvertently explains how the financial industry was able to reconstitute its fortunes so rapidly after the epic debacle of 2008.
Daniel Gross says the three best books on economics this year illuminate the global nature of income inequality.

Rentiers Redux

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century, the best business book on economics of the year, is also perhaps the most discussed and least read book of 2014. Data collected by Amazon via its Kindle suggested that most readers who bought the bestseller didn’t get much past page 26 of the 577-page (before notes) volume.
On a nine-hour flight, during which I had little else to occupy me than this 42-ounce brick of a book, I managed to get through the whole thing. And it turns out the book everybody was blogging and tweeting about was quite different from the one I read. Capital in the 21st Century is not about the 21st-century U.S. or the hoodie-wearing boy titans of Silicon Valley. It is, in large measure, a book about the vast, powerful forces that have made and broken fortunes in Europe—and then made them again. Because of its focus, which is at once sweeping and limited, I found it to be more interesting and useful as an introductory textbook on the basics of macroeconomics, a primer on 20th-century European and U.S. history, and a brief diversion into the literature of giants like Jane Austen (from which Piketty draws descriptions of how people lived and thought about wages, capital, and investments) than as a prophecy.
Piketty, a French economics professor, illustrates the dynamics of wealth, capital, and growth with a simple equation: R > G. “When the rate of return of capital [R] exceeds the rate of growth of output and income [G], as it did in the nineteenth century and seems quite likely to do again in the twenty-first, capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based,” he declares.
For much of human history, the global economy barely grew. Between the year 0 and 1700, world output rose at a trifling 0.1 percent compound annual rate. The Industrial Revolution kicked up the growth rate to 1.6 percent, which, says Piketty, is more rapid than many people realize. This growth rate, combined with low inflation and stable prices, was very good news for people who already had money. Inherited wealth snowballed. It was this dynamic that helped construct the grand boulevards and opulent mansions in European cities that we now regard as paragons of equality. Sweden in the 19th century, writes Piketty, “was not the structurally egalitarian country that we sometimes imagine.” In France in 1910, the top 1 percent had 60 percent of the nation’s wealth, and the top 10 percent had 90 percent. Fraternité et liberté, oui. Egalité, non.
Everything changed in the 20th century. As labor organized, wages began to rise. The disintegration of the colonial empires sapped the wealth of Britain and France. World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Great Depression and the accompanying hyperinflation, the rise of Nazism, and the unfathomable destruction of World War II literally destroyed much of the world’s capital. And taxes went up.
“All rich countries, without exception, went into the twentieth century from an equilibrium in which less than a tenth of their national income was consumed by taxes to a new equilibrium in which the figure rose to between a third and a half,” Piketty writes. Although the U.S. suffered less from the destruction of capital, he notes, its progressive taxes were most aggressive. Confiscatory taxation of excessive incomes was a domestic invention: The U.S. was the first country to try tax rates above 70 percent on income—from 1919 to 1922—and various surcharges brought the top rate to as high as 94 percent in 1944.
The biggest force for equality, however, turned out to be inflation. In a series of very sharp insights, Piketty describes how public debt (government deficits) builds private wealth. Government bonds, paid for by the taxes of the broad public, tend to become assets for the rich people who own most of them. The flip side, of course, is that rentiers can be utterly wiped out when inflation rises sharply, which is what happened in Europe in the period from the 1930s to the 1950s. In France, says Piketty, “the enormous deficits of the Liberation were almost immediately canceled out by inflation above 50 percent per year in the four years 1945–1948.” (Germany, where prices rose 300-fold between 1930 and 1950, “was the country that, more than any other, drowned its public debt in inflation in the twentieth century.”) Thanks in part to inflation, between 1914 and 1945, capital in Europe fell from six or seven times national income to a mere two or three times. The high growth of the period between the 1950s and 1980s further helped labor attract a decent and growing share of income in developed countries.
But Piketty finds that those were mere interludes before the inevitable regression to the mean. After 1980, the reconstruction of Europe having been completed, the high-growth era subsided, the world’s central banks killed off inflation, taxes on the rich were cut, and markets soared. Fortunes reconstituted themselves. In France, for example, inheritance flows had dropped from 24 percent of the economy in 1900 to a low of 4 percent in 1950. But by 2000, they stood at 12 percent of the total economy. Rather than dissipating over time—shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations, as the saying goes—inherited fortunes grew rapidly in the late 20th century. Piketty writes with disdain of Liliane Bettencourt, the heiress to the L’Oréal fortune, “who never worked a day in her life, [but] saw her fortune grow exactly as fast as that of Bill Gates.”
A new wrinkle emerged that helped further tilt the scales toward those at the top. In the 19th century, Piketty explains, people who tried to work their way to riches were chumps. They could never match the gains of capital that already existed. But toward the end of the 20th century, “a stunning new phenomenon emerged… the very top salaries, and especially the pay packages awarded to the top executives of the largest companies and financial firms, reached astonishing heights.” That was in France.
The dynamic of what Piketty calls the “hypermeritocratic society”—a few people getting extremely high salaries—was most pronounced in the United States. Between 1977 and 2007, the richest 1 percent alone vacuumed up 60 percent of the total increase of the country’s national income, pushing inequality levels back to the pre-trust-busting days of 1910. In the U.S., the 1 percent have been running away from the 10 percent, primarily because all-stars—top corporate executives, hedge fund managers, athletes, and top performers in a range of other fields—are raking it in like nobody’s business, in part because they determine their own compensation. Some of those receiving outsized salaries, Piketty notes with irony, are academic economists, who now think the system of “the United States is working fairly well, and, in particular, that it rewards talent and merit accurately and precisely.”
Happiest are those who get paid vast sums from their labor each year, then convert it into capital by investing it. Think of a private equity partner who takes his US$30 million annual payday and plows it into seeding other hedge funds, buying art, and purchasing real estate. Piketty notes, for example, that Bill Gates’s wealth, which is managed by sharp professional investors, has grown just as fast since he stopped working as it did before. “Entrepreneurs thus tend to turn into rentiers, not only with the passing of generations, but even within a single lifetime,” he says.
What can stop these forces from corroding social and political relations? Piketty concludes that a very modest form of confiscation—a global, progressive tax on all forms of wealth—is the only way to rein in inequality while preserving entrepreneurial efforts. But he concedes that “a global tax on capital is a utopian idea.” And so he ends with a certain fatalism about the ever-encroaching power of capital in what is sure to be an age of slow growth. “There is no historical example of a country at the world technological frontier whose growth in per capita output exceeded 1.5 percent over a lengthy period of time,” he writes.
It’s difficult to argue with Piketty’s long-run trends. But I find his reading of history to be too fatalistic, especially as it relates to the short term. If the last 200 years have taught us anything, it is that we should never discount the ability of discontinuities to pop up. Shocks, disruptions, wars, and new technologies have made those who draw straight lines infinitely into the future look like fools with great frequency. For example, there has been no larger economic discontinuity in the past 30 years than China’s emergence as an economic power.
Another quibble with the year’s best business book in this category is that Piketty generally underplays the role of globalization in the rise of capital. Simply put, rich people and the companies they own now have a much broader world to work in. When domestic markets are growing slowly—at 2 or 3 percent—wealthy rentiers have a far greater ability than, say, a small businessperson or a clerk to invest in, participate in, and benefit from the rapid growth in places such as India, Brazil, or, above all, China.

Some Get Rich

The greatest story of our era is China’s so-far successful effort to become less unequal in comparison with other economies in the world. In 1978, the average Chinese income was $200, about one-tenth the world median income. By 2014, it was $6,000, about half the world’s median income. By bringing hundreds of millions of its citizens up from subsistence poverty to a higher standard of living, China is acting as a powerful force against inequality between nations. But the country’s soaring goals, captured lyrically in Evan Osnos’s Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China, are also spurring inequality within China.
Whereas Piketty relies on a combination of large data sets and fictional characters to offer an overview of global developments, Osnos, a New Yorker staff writer, takes us inside the lives of ordinary—and extraordinary—Chinese people. Much of the media coverage of China leads casual readers to see the country’s 1.3 billion inhabitants as an undifferentiated mass of commercially minded automatons: pragmatic and disciplined, forgoing leisure for the sake of national development. But Osnos introduces us to idealistic, stubborn individuals who are intent on making their mark in modern China. When Hu Shuli, the tiny, fearless founding editor of muckraking business magazineCaijing, is pushed out of the magazine by the owner, who has tired of her confrontational approach, she starts a new one. Lin Zhengyi defected from Taiwan in 1979, eager to participate in the rebirth of China, and became a well-known economist. In 2008, he was named chief economist of the World Bank—the first professional from any non-developed market to hold that high post. And then there’s Tang Jie, a graduate student in Western philosophy, who made the highly nationalistic viral Internet movie2008 China Stand Up!
“China reminds me most of America at its own moment of transformation—the period that Mark Twain and Charles Warner named the Gilded Age, when ‘every man has his dream, his pet scheme,’” Osnos writes. And he vividly conveys China’s shady hustling, earnest bustling, and poignant efforts to make up for its lost century—all being led by an authoritarian regime whose mixture of aggression, fear, self-confidence, and inferiority led it to tamp down all types of aspiration not related to making money.
In today’s China, being on the ground floor of any enterprise that gains scale can make you very rich indeed. Jack Ma, a former English teacher who founded e-commerce giant Alibaba, is now one of the wealthiest people in the world, after his firm recently went public. And yet, despite the rampant growth, Osnos finds that opportunity in China is somehow constrained—by corruption, by a shortage of resources, by an overweening state, and by a new Western import: inequality.
“The longer I lived in China, the more it seemed that people had come to see the economic boom as a train with a limited number of seats,” Osnos writes. By 2007, the top 10 percent of urban Chinese were earning 9.2 times as much as the bottom 10 percent. And in 2010, a post charting out how many years it would take a blue-collar worker to earn income sufficient to buy a small apartment in Beijing (about 150) went viral. But public discussion of income inequality is verboten. Among the unintentionally hilarious text messages Osnos receives from the Department of State Council Information Office is this gem: “All websites are requested to remove immediately the article entitled, ‘In China, 94% Unhappy with Wealth Disproportionately Concentrated at the Top.’”
Indeed, Age of Ambition seems to offer a testament to the universality of Piketty’s thesis. Growth in China has been remarkably rapid. But the returns on capital invested in China have risen even faster, creating the same sorts of gaping differentials in economic circumstances that are evident in Europe and the United States. And to a degree, this is by design. “Let some people get rich first,” Deng Xiaoping, the architect of modern China, said.

New Testament Justice

Not even the financial crisis of 2008, which took a healthy bite out of global capital, seemed to affect China significantly. In fact, it didn’t even put much of a crimp in the fortunes of the wealthy in the United States.
Historically, Piketty tells us, financial crises have been great levelers. Certainly, the 2008 crisis should have laid U.S. capital low for a generation, much as the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression did. But thanks in part to a more robust set of institutions (the FDIC, the Federal Reserve) and the aggressive solicitude of politicians of both parties, the system swung into action to save capital from its self-inflicted wounds—a process that is on full display in Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises, an engaging, breezy, and perversely fun memoir from former Treasury secretary Tim Geithner.
Geithner is a creature of capital, even though he never actually worked in finance. Well-meaning, personable, profane, and highly competent, he cut his teeth at the Treasury Department during the global financial scandals of the 1990s. As president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, he had both a responsibility to ward off trouble and a front-row seat. Throughout, he paints himself as a constant worrier about stability and out-of-control capital.
As the Great Recession started, Geithner was reading Liaquat Ahamed’s Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World (Penguin Press, 2009), the magisterial history of the European and U.S. central bankers who botched things horrifically in the 1920s and ’30s. “But I had put it down after a few chapters. It was too scary.” Ever the pragmatist, he rejected the “moral argument about justice, what I called the ‘Old Testament view.’ The venal should be punished. The irresponsible shouldn’t be bailed out.” With regard to capital, Geithner proved to be a distinctly New Testament kind of guy. When a crisis is raging, he says, “the goal should be to protect the innocent, even if some of the arsonists escape their full measure of justice.” This trope appears time and again in Stress Test, as if the two—justice and a functioning system—are mutually exclusive.
In this insider account, full of showdowns with fellow administration members such as Rahm Emanuel and Elizabeth Warren, Geithner argues, correctly, that the bailouts and guarantees largely worked as intended. The TARP money was returned, and a depression was averted. But the innocent weren’t really protected, and the arsonists were rewarded richly. Geithner never adequately explains the dichotomy. The Fed easily invented new powers and instrumentalities to shore up the stock market and financial system, where the rich have their assets. But when it came to bailing out the housing market, which, um, houses the bulk of total wealth for most middle-class people, there was a distinct lack of urgency and effort. Old Testament justice for the homeowners; New Testament justice for their bankers.
Among the dozens of crisis books, Geithner’s stands out partly because it is well written (he was assisted by Time veteran Michael Grunwald). But compared with many of the other protagonists we’ve heard from—especially former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan—he also proves himself to be more pragmatic, self-aware, and self-deprecating. Far from projecting the Olympian calm of Greenspan or former Treasury secretary Hank Paulson, Geithner is forever worrying, nervous, and full of self-doubt. When he was about to assume his role as president of the New York Fed in 2004, he tells us, he got carded at a Manhattan convenience store. Of his first speech as Treasury secretary, he writes, “It was a bad speech, badly delivered, rattling confidence at a bad time.” He provides equally frank descriptions of the bunker behavior of his boss, President Barack Obama, colleagues such as Emanuel and Larry Summers, and frenemies such as former FDIC chair Sheila Bair.
Geithner also tells us that the bailouts succeeded in part because they temporarily transformed huge private obligations into public ones. This financial prestidigitation not only stopped the panic, but paved the way for a recovery favorable to capital. Banks returned to profitability, and the S&P 500 more than doubled, as interest rates and inflation remained low. So the wealthy recovered everything they had lost in the crisis and then some. Meanwhile, median wages and housing prices remain far below their pre-crisis peaks.
According to Geithner, he and his colleagues did their part to reform capital. When lobbyists for financial trade groups came to his office to complain about the Dodd–Frank legislation, he resisted them. “‘My team is beating back your proposals because they’re bad for the country,’ I told them. ‘And we’re going to keep doing it.’”
Geithner also reluctantly supported the Volcker Rule, and small tax increases on higher incomes, which took a bit of wind out of the finance industry’s sails. But only a bit. In our world, the very rich get richer, and they get richer faster than the merely rich. And
it’s not just because of the simple equation of R > G. As Piketty notes, “Wealthy people are constantly coming up with new and ever more sophisticated legal structures to house their fortunes.” What’s more, they’re coming up with new and ever more sophisticated political structures to protect them—friendly government officials of both parties, low tax regimes, and bailouts.
Geithner’s memoir proves instructive here as well. Obama never had the fire in his belly to go after the rich the way that Franklin Delano Roosevelt did. As Geithner describes it, the administration only halfheartedly pursued the so-called Buffett Rule, which would ensure that the very wealthy would pay an effective tax rate of at least 30 percent. At several different points, Obama had opportunities to undo the Bush-era tax cuts, which favored the wealthy. But he never pressed too hard. After eight years of the Obama administration, tax rates on carried interest, estates, high incomes, and capital gains and dividends will all be lower than they were during the Clinton administration.
Capital is doing quite well indeed in the 21st century—thanks to the natural advantages it enjoys, to be sure. But it’s also doing well in part because of the substantial lift it has received from Communists in China and from the United States’ most progressive president in a half century. Très ironique. 
Reprint No. 00293

AUTHOR PROFILE:

  • Daniel Gross is a columnist for Slate and the Daily Beast. His most recent book is Better, Stronger, Faster: The Myth of American Decline and the Rise of a New Economy (Free Press, 2012).

Estratégia - Comentários Melhores livros 2014 segundo Strategy+Business

J.-C. Spender
Business Strategy: Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise
(Oxford University Press, 2014)
Sanjay Khosla and Mohanbir Sawhney
Fewer, Bigger, Bolder: From Mindless Expansion to Focused Growth
(Penguin Portfolio, 2014)
John P. Kotter
Accelerate: Building Strategic Agility for a Faster-Moving World
(Harvard Business Review Press, 2014)

Notwithstanding all the carefully plotted doctoral dissertations, countless hours of research, and contentious discussions among serious management thinkers, strategy boils down to three fundamental questions: First, how can you differentiate yourself from the competition in the way you create value? Second, what capabilities do you have that are distinct from those of your rivals and essential to your particular way of creating value? Third, what businesses should you be in, and what products and services should you offer, given your chosen approach to creating value and your particular set of distinctive capabilities?
Most companies fail to fully answer these questions—particularly in a fashion that views them as an integral whole. This leaves leaders without guideposts to navigate the most pivotal challenges of corporate management, including transformation, change, agility, and invention. As a result, instead of growth and innovation, there is only incoherence and inefficiency.
Take, for example, eBay’s acquisition of Skype for US$2.6 billion in 2005. With this deal, eBay hoped to become more than an e-commerce company; it wanted to become a global networking player. But eBay’s particular online capabilities and buttoned-down, transaction-heavy culture were ill equipped to assimilate a company in the voice telecommunications market. Moreover, it was unclear how eBay’s approach to marketplace differentiation complemented Skype’s, and vice versa. Five years later, after writing down nearly $1 billion in losses, eBay sold Skype.
EBay’s error was an all-too-common one: Corporate executives often conflate strategy with vision, mission, purpose, plans, or goals. Although these elements may help to focus, inspire, mobilize, and challenge an organization, they are not substitutes for a logical, articulated strategy, and they often lead to helter-skelter corporate development.
So it is also with many business books that are supposed to be about strategy. In lieu of actually discussing the subject, they frequently tiptoe around it. Nonetheless, several books released during the past year offer unique ideas and new thinking for how strategy can help businesses continually innovate, execute, and maintain the dexterity needed to anticipate and outpace competitive challenges and market disruption. Each is practical and simple without being simplistic, and offers convincing evidence for its core premise.

Innovative Strategy

In Business Strategy: Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise, J.-C. Spender takes what he calls the “entrepreneurial” path to corporate growth and market response. To the peripatetic business professor and retired dean of the School of Business & Technology at SUNY/Fashion Institute of Technology, strategy is the product of executive imagination and judgment, not just logic; the strategy process involves balancing the known, the unknown, and the unknowable. The purpose of strategic analyses, frameworks, and methods is to inspire inventiveness and inform judgment.
Spender arrives at this position by comparing the quantitative planning techniques popular in organizations after World War II—which were mostly developed by the military during the war—with the more subjective, less rigid strategic methodologies that appeared in the 1980s and that are now widespread in the business world. In the earlier era, the dominant idea was to match a firm’s resources to the market’s demands. The company’s business model was tailored to customer needs, suppliers’ offerings, labor availability, logistics, and the like. If a mismatch occurred, the resulting inefficiencies would reduce profit and threaten the firm’s survival.
By contrast, explains Spender, the modern strategy process must be a much more forward-looking activity, because efficiency is no longer enough to deliver a decisive strategic advantage in many industries; instead, a so-called monopoly-based strategic advantage is needed. He cites Apple’s dominance of the tablet business to illustrate the overwhelming necessity of innovation as a means of securing sustainable, above-normal profits, “especially where the ‘windows of competitive advantage’ seem to be opening and closing with increasing speed.”
Business Strategy does an extremely thorough job of surveying the consulting tools and academic economic models and theories available to corporate strategists. The book describes in some detail the salient facets of the most essential methodologies and concepts, including SWOT, Porter’s five forces, the experience curve, the balanced scorecard, the value chain, horizontal and vertical integration, and more. But again and again, Spender returns to the notion that companies must avoid letting these tools stymie their flexibility by over-objectifying decision making. Ultimately, he argues, added value stems from the strategist’s choices—the entrepreneur’s imagination and judgment—not from reams of analysis or data-based conclusions.
By way of example, Spender compares two strategic milestones: IBM’s decision in the 1940s to turn down the patents and processes for electrophotography developed by Chester Carlson, which became the basis of the Xerox machine, and Intel’s ceding of the DRAM market to low-cost Japanese competitors in the 1980s in order to focus on microprocessors. Based on market conditions at the time, IBM believed the customer base for electrophotography was too small and chose to sit on the sidelines; Intel, meanwhile, decided it could build a monopolistic position in microprocessors when neither the market potential nor the manufacturing challenges were well understood. In Spender’s view, IBM hewed to the safety of the known to its detriment, whereas Intel rode the wave of strategic risk by using data analyses as the basis of a calculated leap into the unknown and unknowable.
Spender devotes a chapter in the book to the role of executives in communicating the organization’s strategy to employees so that it is effectively executed. And although he delves deeply into a variety of techniques for disseminating a company’s strategic program (rhetorical, formal and informal, group and individual), he concedes that if successful strategies—and, indeed, successful companies—are built on imagination, motivating people to collaborate requires equally inspired approaches. As Spender advises: “The rhetorical practice that shapes the creative actions of others is precisely what makes the modern firm possible.”
Executives will ignore at their peril the fundamental message of Business Strategy: Once-popular mechanistic planning methodologies no longer work; they have been replaced by innovation-based models that demand flexibility and creativity. A choice to use anything less, Spender argues, is the precursor of corporate atrophy.

The Opportunity Landscape

In Fewer, Bigger, Bolder: From Mindless Expansion to Focused Growth, Sanjay Khosla, former president of Kraft Foods’ developing markets unit, and Mohanbir Sawhney, director of the Center for Research in Technology and Innovation at the Kellogg School of Management, propose a framework for sustainable growth. Called Focus7, it consists of seven steps that begin with searching for growth and end with measuring and communicating progress.
Developing strategy (or picking your bets, as the authors call it) is the second step of Focus7, and it entails navigating the “opportunity landscape.” This methodology has four dimensions, each with two lenses: (1) what you offer, with brand and product lenses; (2) who you serve, with customer and partner lenses; (3) where you go to market, with channel and market lenses; and (4) how you operate, with monetization and process lenses.
Along the way, the authors provide apt examples, making this step refreshingly tangible. For instance, regarding the customer lens, Khosla and Sawhney aver that Enterprise Rent-A-Car’s number one position (by revenue) in its category is based on the company’s unique and relentless emphasis since 1957 on addressing a specific consumer problem—the need for a replacement car. While Enterprise’s competitors bloodied each other at the airports, Enterprise opened more than 5,000 outlets in neighborhoods across the U.S. to furnish autos to local people whose vehicles were being repaired or who didn’t own a car, but needed one for a special occasion.
Although entertaining and informative, this section, like much of the principal argument in the book, avoids a coherent discussion of strategy itself. Presumably, a good strategy is the product of a “focused” set of bets, whereas a bad strategy results from a “mindless” one. It’s hard to argue with this view of the difference between good and bad strategies, chiefly because it is a tautology. This weakness aside, the notion of an opportunity landscape does provide the basis for a higher-level strategy debate in which all companies must engage to succeed. And the authors present a useful series of ideas to explore in assessing your company’s performance and prospects.
What most intrigued me about Fewer, Bigger, Bolder—and what makes it well worth adding to your reading list—are Khosla’s in-depth anecdotes about how he altered the fortunes of the Kraft units he led. In those sections, the book takes on a fly-on-the-wall quality, providing a valuable insider and, yes, strategic perspective of an executive’s thought processes as he effectively manages a turnaround.
When Khosla joined Kraft in 2007, the company had expanded wildly into international markets, but its earnings were coming at a premium. Its sales campaigns lacked discipline, and there was no economic justification for the vast resources that Kraft expended on these efforts. To fix this, Khosla implemented a program known as 5-10-10, under which Kraft’s dozens of product categories, 100-plus brands, and 60-country portfolio were pared down to five strong categories, 10 brands, and 10 markets that the company would focus on and support. Within six years, Khosla’s division tripled its revenue to $16 billion, and profitability grew by 50 percent.
The 5-10-10 buckets were populated through a series of global workshops that represented a substantial shift away from Kraft’s centralized top-down structure—an approach that executive readers hoping to simplify decision making in large organizations should consider emulating. Kraft regional managers, as well as vendors, consultants, investment bankers, and consumers, attended the workshops. Although the agendas were strict, the participants were encouraged to speak freely, share evidence and anecdotes to back up their points of view, and propose practical solutions. Perhaps most important, and useful from a management perspective, Khosla demanded that the top brass in these meetings, including himself, be muted. “The point is to let the discussion roam without regard to past practices or current favorite initiatives,” the authors say. “Even the body language of the ranking executive can tilt the proceedings and inhibit the openness that’s necessary for best results.”
Khosla’s decentralized approach to the workshops opened up the possibility of more autonomy at the local level throughout Kraft, and regional managers were given greater latitude in decision making and enjoyed greater influence in the organization. This eventually led to the most notable marketing success in Kraft’s recent history. During the 2013 Super Bowl at the New Orleans Superdome, a power outage occurred just after the second half started, and the game was stopped for more than a half hour. Almost as soon as the blackout hit, Kraft’s Oreo marketing team came up with a creative tweet to play off the cookie’s well-known “Twist, Lick, Dunk” campaign: “Power out? No problem. You can still dunk in the dark.”
That short, free ad was retweeted 10,000 times in the next hour, and the publicity that Kraft received for it over the next few days was priceless. The tweet, though, was possible only because the company’s leadership equation had been altered. “The authority to approve the tweet had been pushed down far enough that the decision could be made almost instantaneously,” the authors write.
The description of the international expansion campaign that Khosla put in place is a guide to creative executive decision making that C-suite readers can emulate to their advantage. And, although the definition of strategy is somewhat nebulous in Fewer, Bigger, Bolder, Khosla’s success at Kraft nods at the good things that can happen when strategy and tactics align.

A Structure for Strategic Agility

Accelerate: Building Strategic Agility for a Faster-Moving World, by John P. Kotter, the Konosuke Matsushita Professor of Leadership Emeritus at Harvard Business School, is primarily about the ability to adjust strategy quickly in response to changes in the global business environment. This is a ripe topic for discussion (as well as one in which Kotter, a noted change expert, specializes).
Navigating the tension between maintaining a stable business model that has produced consistent results and embracing reinvention is a difficult challenge for most companies. Strategic stability can be quite rewarding and is the hallmark of great companies such as Wells Fargo, Southwest Airlines, Walmart, and Walt Disney. But there are also many once-dominant companies whose strategies became obsolete faster than they were able to respond to shifting market and competitive conditions—for example, Blockbuster and Research in Motion, two companies cited in Accelerate.
In Kotter’s view, businesses today cannot afford to be complacent. (Can they ever?) Yet he offers a convincing portrait of a typical organization’s life cycle to demonstrate that, despite their best intentions, most companies naturally lose their innovative edge as they evolve. As he depicts it, successful startups have a strong, market-focused vision, delineated initially by the entrepreneur founder. The company is more of a network than a pyramid. At the center is the entrepreneur and his or her closest advisors; linked to them like planets in a solar system are people managing various initiatives, often associated with developing and testing new products and services. At this stage, the organization chart is relatively flat and the company is fluid; a once-promising initiative can be dropped on the fly in favor of a better idea. “This kind of agility can enable a successful young firm to run circles around more mature competitors,” Kotter writes.
Most companies naturally lose their innovative edge as they evolve.
With success, however, come formal processes and a management structure—an operational hierarchy to ensure that the company can satisfy its growing market. At the same time, the original entrepreneurial system does not fade away. The hierarchy and the network coexist to drive efficiency and innovation, respectively. This period, Kotter contends, is extraordinary, marked by widening profits, an excellent culture, and favorable capital markets. Unfortunately, the phase is usually short-lived. As growth escalates, operational needs expand, and before long, the hierarchy, which increasingly controls company resources, begins to dwarf and minimize the network. At the end of this evolution, the company may have a strong market position, great brands, good relations with customers, and economies of scale, but it will have lost its agility and innovative edge. In other words, it is now vulnerable to attack from a nimbler startup.
Given this inevitable progression, Kotter argues, the only way to sustain market share and simultaneously beat the competition into new markets is to re-create the dual operating system that the company had when it was at its best. The left side of the company would consist of the traditional business and its hierarchy; the right side would be populated by a “volunteer army” led by a “guiding coalition” overseeing a dynamic network, free of bureaucratic layers, whose job would be to drive strategic initiatives that would stall if relegated to the left-side bureaucracy. Kotter’s five principles for forming and managing this network are the accelerators of the book’s title.
To support his point of view, Kotter tells the story of an unnamed B2B technology company whose global market share was tumbling primarily because it lagged behind competitors in Asian expansion and new product development. Within two years of implementing the dual-operating approach, the company experienced a marked turnaround: Annual revenue growth more than doubled, to more than 60 percent, and the company rose from fourth to second in market share. Moreover, the company’s market capitalization ballooned 155 percent, to $10 billion-plus.
Because Accelerate delivers such a potentially valuable message, the fact that it does not address the significance of coherent strategy as a prerequisite for successful innovation creates a big hole. Absent that discussion, it’s unclear, for example, how the right-side network’s purpose—to make strategy and its implementation more agile—is aligned with the company’s strategy itself. Some aspects of strategy, such as pricing the value proposition or changing the portfolio, can be remixed relatively quickly and frequently; but other elements, such as the capabilities that differentiate a business or the types of customers it chooses to target, cannot be altered overnight.
Nevertheless, as a new way of looking at agility and flexibility, Kotter’s thesis is extremely appealing. It presents a valuable course of action that speaks to a particularly challenging conundrum for maturing companies—that is, how to combine the dexterity of the startup years with the knowledge gained from experience. For this reason, I choose Accelerate as the best business book of the year on strategy. It brings much-needed insight as to why big companies struggle with implementing strategic innovation, and it recommends a practical approach to solving that problem. In doing so, it has the potential to bring inside the walls of our most successful enterprises the benefits of creative destruction.
All three books have a lot to offer. Readers who have a solid foundation already in place—especially a clear definition of their strategy in mind before starting page one—will come away from these selections better equipped with practical and compelling ideas to help implement those strategies in the real world.
Reprint No. 00287

AUTHOR PROFILE:

  • Ken Favaro is a senior partner with Strategy& based in New York. A longtime advisor to business leaders and a co-teacher of a course on strategic innovation at Columbia Business School, he leads the firm’s work in enterprise strategy and finance.

segunda-feira, 13 de outubro de 2014

Socialnomics

Esse video fala sobre o presente e fornece algumas estatísticas do que está acontecendo hoje em termos de mídias sociais. Entenda sobre o presente para saber como o futuro está se formando... Ou não! Curta o presente!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxpa4dNVd3c&list=UULC9cX5GntaQmTSF6hTqrzA&feature=share&index=5

sexta-feira, 21 de março de 2014

Fim do poder ou Dispersão do poder

Considerações interessantes do escritor venezuelano Naim sobre o poder e o mundo de hoje. O texto serve como base para diversas reflexões e pesquisas. Fiz a retirada de uma parte do texto e formatei  para facilitar a leitura e compreensão. Publicado em Època março 2014.

A idéia central de Naim diz respeito não tanto ao desaparecimento, mas à fragmentação do poder. A primeira imagem que utiliza é a do xadrez. Em 1970, havia 71 grandes mestres. Hoje, seu número já ultrapassa os 1,2 mil. Alguém poderia retrucar dizendo que não vivemos o fim, mais proliferação do poder. Há simplesmente mais gente em condições de competir.  A vida anda mais complicada para quem detém o poder, e relativamente mais fácil para quem quer entrar no jogo.

1. O dado mais evidente a demonstrar a tese de Naim é a própria dispersão do poder entre os estados soberanos. Em 1947, eram 67 países, ao redor do planeta, contra os 193 existentes, atualmente.

2. Também a democracia se expandiu. Segundo a Freedom House, temos hoje 117 democracias eleitorais. Eram 69, no final dos anos oitenta. Pela primeira vez na história, mais de metade da população do globo vive em regimes democráticos.

3. Entre as 2,5 mil maiores empresas do planeta, na lista Forbes 2012, há duzentas companhias americanas a menos do que havia cinco anos antes. Vivemos o que Jeffrey Sachs chama a era da convergência. 

4. Dado do Tesouro australiano, no dia 28 de março de 2012, pela primeira vez na história, o tamanho das economias menos desenvolvidas superou a dos países ricos.

5 O tempo médio de permanência de um CEO, em companhias de maior porte, caiu pela metade. De 10 anos, em média, nos anos 90, para 5,5 anos, nos dias de hoje. Estamos falando de menos previsibilidade, concorrência mais acirrada e mais barreiras para colocar decisões em prática.


O coração da tese de Naim são as “três revoluções” do nosso tempo.

1. A primeira é a “revolução do mais”. Mais renda e riqueza, para começar. A renda per capita cresceu 3,5 vezes, desde 1950. Mais gente educada e com acesso à informação. 84% da população global é hoje alfabetizada, contra 75%, em 1990. Os números sugerem aquela que talvez seja a grande tendência desta primeira metade de século XXI: a migração da escassez para a abundância, em escala global. Naim não chega a tanto, mas tem coragem de reconhecer o que muitos fazem de conta, por charme ou ideologia, que não enxergam: o fim gradativo da pobreza e a emergência de sociedade de classe média. Até o final da década, a classe média global será formada por mais de três bilhões de pessoas. Gente mais bem informada, ávida pela integração ao mundo do consumo, impaciente com a inépcia e a corrupção dos governos. O Fim do Poder não deixa de ser, neste prisma, um manifesto de esperança. A esperança de que um punhado de avanços materiais e sociais nos levará ao progresso civilizatório. Naim chega mesmo a sugerir uma fórmula iluminista, dizendo que "quando as pessoas são mais numerosas e vivem vidas mais plenas, tornam-se mais difíceis de regular, controlar e dominar". Lendo estas palavras, me veio à mente Stefan Zweig e sua descrição elegante da república de Weimar, seguida da imensa desilusão, com a prostração de alguns milhões de alemães bem educados ao nacional socialismo.

2. A fórmula iluminista se repete quando ele trata da sua segunda revolução, a da “mobilidade”. “O poder precisa de uma audiência cativa”, afirma. Naim cita a frase, de gosto duvidoso, do ex-conselheiro de segurança nacional do Governo Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, segundo o qual é mais fácil, nos dias de hoje, matar 100 milhões de pessoas do que as controlar. De todo modo, há estatísticas de sobra para sustentar a tese de Naim: o número de migrantes, planeta afora, cresceu 37% nos últimos vinte anos; em 2012, pela primeira vez, nasceram mais bebês “não brancos”, nos Estados Unidos. O planeta se move. As pessoas viajam mais, tendo se multiplicado por quatro o fluxo turístico, desde os anos 80. Vivemos em um planeta urbano. Desde 2007, a população das cidades superou a das áreas rurais. É no ambiente urbano, desde sempre, que florescem o pensamento crítico e a contestação ao poder.


Naim evita superestimar o papel da internet, na erosão do poder, o que soa como um erro. Difícil não perceber como as redes sócias e os smartphones simplesmente explodiram o poder. Manuel Castells estudou as revoltas populares em mais de oitenta países, mundo afora, em seu Redes de Indignação e Esperança, e em quase todas o elemento flash mob dava as cartas. Os ativistas digitais saíram às ruas. O resultado é paradoxal: para os donos do poder, as coisas ficaram mais difíceis. O poder se tornou, por definição, instável. Para quem contesta o poder, porém, as coisas não ficaram necessariamente mais fáceis. Dez capas seguidas em uma revista com mais de um milhão de exemplares, contra o governo, num País do tamanho do Brasil, não parecem causar dano maior às estruturas do poder. Para cada notícia contra, há dez versões a favor, e assim segue, numa espécie de jogo de espelhos. Há a internet inteira, as redes, a blogosfera, amortecendo o impacto de cada notícia. Algo que lembra Jean Baudrillard, o lírico pós-moderno, para quem a sociedade da informação fez com que o universo virtual se expandisse a uma velocidade maior do que o real. O resultado é que a informação se banaliza. O mesmo ocorre com a atividade intelectual. Vargas Llosa já havia identificado o fenômeno. Os intelectuais perdem relevância como consciência crítica da sociedade. Ainda bem, penso eu. Isto ocorre pelas razões de Naim: pelo excesso. De idéias, de gente escrevendo, opinando, argumentando, publicando.

3. Naim vincula o fim do poder com uma revolução do pensamento. Em primeiro lugar, há mais expectativas. Não é a privação que produz a revolta, mas a esperança. O aumento da renda tende a gerar uma inconformidade positiva. As pessoas simplesmente querem mais, e percebem que dispõem de poder para exigir. Em segundo lugar, vivemos uma época de ceticismo. Dos anos sessenta até hoje, o percentual de americanos que acham que o governo está “fazendo a coisa certa” caiu de 75% para 25%. Os governos de hoje, decididamente, não são piores do que os do passado. A diferença é que John Kennedy podia ter quantas amantes quisesse, ao passo que François Hollande mal pode dar um passeio de lambreta. O poder foi profanado, e teremos que aprender a conviver com a permanente sensação de instabilidade, de que algo não vai bem, que acompanhará a vida democrática, doravante.

A erosão do poder traz ainda um perigo: a perda de governabilidade das democracias. Em 2012, 30 das 34 democracias mais ricas do planeta tinham presidentes ou primeiro ministros com minoria no parlamento. O resultado é a paralisia. Francis Fukuyama cunhou mesmo uma expressão para definir este fenômeno: a vetodemocracia. O exemplo mais emblemático foi o fechamento do governo norte-americano, por 16 dias, em outubro do ano passado. No Brasil, o governo lidera uma coalizão majoritária, mas o quadro de paralisia é semelhante. O país já cansou de falar em reformas estruturais, mas pouco se avança. Vivemos sob o espectro de uma sociedade hiper-organizada, repleta de redes de protesto, com uma miríade de grupos sem força para chegar ao poder, mas capazes de “paralisar o jogo”. São os sindicatos impedindo a modernização da legislação trabalhista, corporações de professores impedindo a reforma da educação, ou, em um plano mais amplo, o governo como um todo em marcha lenta, com seus quarenta ministérios, perdido em uma coalizão de quatorze partidos.

Dizer que o planeta está prestes a realizar o sonho kantiano, da grande comunidade de repúblicas, em que vigora a hospitalidade universal seria um exagero, mas o mundo é, nos dias de hoje, claramente mais hostil aos infratores de direitos. A cena das multidões passeando pelo palácio do presidente Yanukovitch, recém deposto na Ucrânia, e o levante popular contra o regime chavista, na Venezuela, caem como luva para a tese de Naim. Ele diz que nossa época assiste a um “consenso moral jamais visto”, sobre como os países devem se comportar. Talvez seu próximo livro mereça um capítulo sobre como retirar este consenso da esfera moral e o colocar em prática. O que fazer com a Coréia do Norte, por exemplo e, mais difícil, com tipos como ex-astro de basquete, Dennis Rodman e todos os apreciadores de regimes autoritários, mundo afora. Sobre como criar uma cultura democrática forte o suficiente para evitar que se repita a história trágica da elegante republica de Weimar.